'Sapient trouble-tombs'? : archaeologists' moral obligations to the dead. by Scarre,  Geoffrey
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
25 June 2014
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Scarre, Geoﬀrey (2013) Sapient trouble-tombs'? : archaeologists' moral obligations to the dead.', in The
Oxford handbook of the archaeology of death and burial. , pp. 665-676. Oxford handbooks in archaeology.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199569069.do
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is a draft of a chapter that was accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the book 'The Oxford
handbook of the archaeology of death and burial' edited by Sarah Tarlow and Liv Nilsson Stutz and published in 2013.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
‘Sapient trouble-tombs’?  Archaeologists’ moral obligations to the dead 
 
Geoffrey Scarre 
Department of Philosophy, Durham University, UK 
 
Keywords: archaeology, the dead, harm, posthumous interests, respect, Vermillion 
Accord 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter argues that moral questions raised by archaeological research on human 
remains are helpfully studied in the context of a broader range of questions about the 
ethically proper relations between the living and the dead.  How, for instance, if death is 
extinction of the self, can anything that is done to a person’s remains after her death 
constitute a harm or wrong?  Whilst a common moral intuition prompts us to treat the 
remains, memories and antemortem wishes of the dead with respect, justifying that 
intuition has proved to be problematic on the assumption that the dead are no more.  
However, recent philosophical work is adduced to show that persuasive reasons can be 
given for treating the dead respectfully, that these reasons are distinct from those relating 
to archaeologists’ responsibilities to descendant communities, and that they do not 
preclude all archaeological work that deals with the dead, though they do attach strings to 
it.  
 
1. Introduction 
Archaeological research commonly involves the disturbance of burials, the disinterment 
of the dead, and the (sometimes destructive) study of skeletal and other physical remains 
of once-living human beings.  The corporeal fragments that remain, together with 
associated grave goods, are sometimes returned to the place and community of origin (in 
the USA, for instance, under NAGPRA provisions) but may also be retained for future 
investigation or even museum display.  To give some idea of numbers, it is estimated that 
UK institutions alone hold the remains of no fewer than 61,000 individuals – the 
population of a small city (DCMS 2003: para.34).  Worldwide, the total runs into several 
millions.  Many archaeologists, anthropologists and museum curators in recent years 
have paid sympathetic heed to the requests of indigenous communities for the repatriation 
of ‘their’ dead; but there has been relatively little attention devoted to the ethical 
responsibilities of researchers towards the dead themselves.   
     This is perhaps unsurprising in view of the inevitable puzzles that arise when we start 
to think about the moral obligations of the living to the dead.  In fact, we might wonder 
whether there can really be any moral responsibilities to people who are no more, or who 
at least are permanently removed from the living scene.  Thomas Jefferson was adamant 
that one must be alive to be the subject of interests that can form the basis of rights: ‘But 
the dead have no rights. They are nothing; and nothing cannot own something’ (Jefferson 
1816).  In similar vein, the UK Human Rights Act 1988, displaying what its drafters 
doubtless considered to be rugged common sense, states that one must be alive to be a 
victim of rights abuse.  Yet many people intuitively feel that we can act wrongly towards 
the dead, for example by undermining their reputations or failing to observe their 
reasonable testamentary wishes; and interfering with a burial against what may be 
presumed to have been the formerly living person’s wish to be allowed to rest in peace 
may arouse a similar sense of moral discomfort.  Unless we believe that the dead 
continue to exist as souls or spirits aware of what goes on in this sublunary world, it is 
hard to see how such treatment can do them any actual harm (especially since it is only 
the physical remains that are being disturbed, and a person cannot be simply identified 
with her corpse).  But the recognition that what are being investigated are the remains of 
people with whom we share a common humanity persuades many to think that the dead 
should, in Kantian phrase, be treated respectfully as ends in themselves, and not merely 
as means to others’ ends. 
    Of course not all archaeologists have allowed such thoughts of a common humanity to 
put much of a brake on their professional activities.  Sir Mortimer Wheeler’s oft-quoted 
words have acquired a certain notoriety: ‘We do no harm to those poor chaps.  When I’m 
dead you can dig me up ten times for all I care’ (quoted in Bahn 1984: 214).  Such 
‘sapient trouble-tombs’ (in Charles Lamb’s delightful phrase) as Sir Mortimer evidently 
believe that since the dead are beyond good and evil, then nothing that happens to their 
physical remains makes any difference to them (whatever effects it may have on the 
living who are linked to the dead by ties of affection, kindred or community).  On this 
view, where there is no harm, there can be no disrespect.  But most archaeologists find it 
hard to treat human remains with the same moral and emotional indifference that they do 
mere artefacts; bones belong to their owners in a much more intimate sense than do their 
pots, jewellery or weapons, and demand a special kind of recognition.  Human remains 
are unique amongst items of archaeological study in being parts of people rather than 
mere extraneous possessions.  A sense of shared humanity prompts researchers to accord 
human bone and tissue a dignity not felt to be owed to any associated objects found with 
them, however valuable or significant those may be in other respects.  Breeur and Burms 
remark that ‘[a] dead human body is treated as if the significance of the living person 
were still dwelling in it in some way: most people think that they should respect or 
honour it and believe that desecrating it would be cruel, immoral and criminal’ (Breeur 
and Burms 2008: 138).  The same point is sensitively captured in the recent report of the 
Church of England/English Heritage Advisory Panel on the Archaeology of Christian 
Burials in England: human remains are special because while ‘a corpse has no more 
eternal significance than an empty shell,’ it still possesses ‘meaning as the visible 
manifestation of one with whom we lived, laughed and conversed’ (Church of England 
2005: para.156).    
    The moral question of how archaeological human remains should be treated is best 
perceived as an aspect of a larger question about the ethically proper relations between 
the living and the dead.  It might be expected that the views we hold about the 
metaphysical status of the dead (e.g. are the deceased extinct, or do they retain some form 
of existence as souls or spirits?) would have a considerable bearing on our opinions on 
the moral proprieties.  Yet, at least within western culture, their impact is often 
remarkably slight.  People who hold that death marks the end of the personal subject 
usually believe as firmly as those who maintain the reality of an after-life that it would be 
wrong to flout a deceased person’s legitimate testamentary wishes, or break a promise we 
made to her on her deathbed, or donate her body against her will to medical research.  
What Joel Feinberg has termed a person’s ‘moral estate’ (on analogy with her legal 
estate) is customarily acknowledged to survive her death by people whose understanding 
of the significance of death otherwise varies widely (Feinberg 1984: 83).  However, it is 
not so easy to make philosophical sense of the notion of a moral estate which outlasts its 
owner.  The analogy with a legal estate soon falls down, because while the latter consists 
in property, rights and entitlements which can pass straightforwardly to new owners, the 
former seemingly involves un-transferable abstract rights and obligations which have 
assumed a mysterious free-floating existence.  But now the metaphysical bona fides of a 
posthumously surviving moral estate looks dubious, for how can there be rights without a 
right-holder or interests in the absence of an interested subject?  (It is sometimes thought 
that while we cannot harm the dead, we can wrong them, but there is still something 
mysterious about the idea of wronging a non-existent subject; moreover, it would remain 
to be explained how a person could be wronged by something that did not adversely 
affect her interests.)   
    Perhaps Wheeler was right after all and it really doesn’t matter what we do to the dead 
(provided we don’t hurt the feelings of the living), since there is no subject around 
anymore to be harmed or wronged.   
 
 2. The discourse of ‘respect’ 
Justifiably or not, the idiom of ‘respect’ has become the dominant one in contemporary 
discourse about archaeology and the dead.  The highly influential Vermillion Accord on 
Human Remains drawn up by the WAC Inter-Congress in 1989 makes frequent use of the 
term ‘respect’, its first two principles enjoining that: 
1. Respect for the mortal remains of the dead shall be accorded to all, irrespective of 
origin, race, religion, nationality, custom and tradition. 
2. Respect for the wishes of the dead concerning disposition shall be accorded 
whenever possible, reasonable and lawful, when they are known or can be 
reasonably inferred. 
    That ‘respect’ has become a buzz-word in archaeological ethics is not surprising in 
view of its popularity in many modern ethical debates.  The Concise Oxford Dictionary 
defines the relevant sense of the noun ‘respect’ as ‘deferential esteem felt or shown 
towards person or quality’.  Respect can take many different objects – individuals, 
groups, genders, institutions, creeds, stances, art-works or other precious things, to name 
but a few – and it characteristically combines an attitudinal with an active-dispositional 
component (in other words, respect should not just be felt but also demonstrated).  Since 
people sometimes respect wrong or unworthy things, it is always worth asking what 
justifies a claim that such-and-such deserves respect.  Principles such as those agreed to 
at the Vermillion meeting thus require fleshing out with a cogent rationale as well as 
some detailed prescriptions for application. 
      There are at least four different modes in which the notion of respect might be applied 
when it comes to dealing with the dead, namely: 
1. respect for the persons whose remains are at issue; 
2. respect for the remains themselves; 
3. respect for humanity, as represented in the remains; 
4. respect for the feelings and wishes of surviving relatives and/or genetic or cultural 
descendants of the dead.  
The distinction between 1-3, on the one hand, and 4, on the other, has frequently been 
noted (for instance, the Vermillion Accord contains a separate clause concerning the 
respect due to the wishes of ‘the local community and of relatives or guardians of the 
dead’).  But often – though the Vermillion Accord is a partial exception – modes 1-3 are 
conflated, or not clearly or consistently distinguished.  This matters because the different 
dimensions of respect may not evoke the same patterns of action in every case.  So 
archaeologists may think they show all needful respect when they handle human bones 
with a certain degree of reverence and care (respect type 2), yet they may be paying no 
heed to their owners’ known or suspected wishes that their remains should be undisturbed 
(respect type 1).  Arguably the handling of those bones as tools of research is also 
incompatible with the respect due to humanity (respect type 3), if Kant is right that we 
should always treat human beings as end-in-themselves and never solely as means; for 
while bones maketh not the man, using the bones of an unconsenting subject could be 
considered to be treating him without the respect due to an end-in-himself, and thus by 
implication in a manner insulting to humanity. 
     It should be apparent that respect of type 2 – respect for the remains themselves – is 
less fundamental than respect of types 1 and 3, and is plausibly regarded as derivative 
from one or both of them.  For it is the identity of bones and other remains as parts of 
human persons that entitles them to a degree of reverential handling.  An archaeologist 
who believed that she fully discharges her moral responsibilities so long as she does not 
wilfully or pointlessly destroy, discard or play games with human skeletal material would 
be suffering from moral tunnel vision, blind to the broader ethical context which makes 
such behaviour wrong.  (This charge may not, however, apply to Gerald Vizenor’s 
somewhat fanciful proposal (in Vizenor 1996) to establish ‘bone courts’ in which 
archaeological human bones are ascribed rights and allowed legal representation by 
trained advocates, assuming that its underlying intention is to do justice to the persons 
whose remains they are.)     
     The idiom of respect for the dead and their remains may seem attractive in enabling us 
to sidestep the conceptual difficulties arising from the non-existence, or the permanent 
non-presence, of the dead.  If it is hard to understand how the dead can leave behind a 
moral estate of present interests, it may seem easier to grant that they can still be the 
object of respect or disrespect.  I can have respectful thoughts, or say respectful things, 
about Queen Victoria even though her status as deceased appears to preclude my doing 
anything to benefit or harm her.  Respect and disrespect belong to a class of attitudes – 
others include remembering, admiring, regretting, praising and being proud or ashamed 
of – that can be held towards no-longer-existent persons and things.  While the past is a 
foreign country, it can be visited in thought, guided by the relics that remain.  And the 
way we treat those relics is the best test of the sincerity of our claimed attitudes.  An 
archaeologist who purported to respect ancient skeletons and their owners but threw the 
bones away as soon as her research was done would be likely to find her pretensions 
questioned.  Even if such behaviour did no harm to the dead, it would scarcely be 
compatible with holding them in respect.      
    But intuitively appealing though this line of thought may be, it is problematic on two 
counts.  First, it is not clear that it really circumvents the problem of the non-existence of 
the dead.  Since treating a person disrespectfully is itself a mode of wronging her, we 
need to know that we can wrong the non-existent dead before we can be sure we can treat 
them disrespectfully!  This point is easily missed when we slur over the difference 
between being respectful to a person and being respectful about her.  It is perfectly 
possible to say respectful things about the deceased Queen Victoria, but it is impossible 
to show respect to her, as a courtier in her day could have done.  Someone who now 
makes disparaging comments about Victoria may offend her present-day admirers but not 
the Queen herself.  And since the disturbance or destruction of human remains likewise 
has no potential impact on the subject, it is equally unclear how it could be disrespectful 
towards the dead themselves.  Indeed, if the eternal non-presence of the dead debars them 
from being possible objects of respect or disrespect, then the belief that we can show the 
dead type 1 respect is simply false, a moral illusion born (perhaps) of the difficulty we 
have in grasping the real finality of death.  Further, if respect of type 1 is impossible, and 
respect of type 2 – that shown to the remains themselves – is derivative from the former, 
then the latter must also be baseless.  Arguably the cavalier handling of human bones 
may show a generalised disrespect to humanity – (dis)respect of type 3 – and be 
objectionable on that score, but it would not be specifically disrespectful to the owners of 
the bones.   
       The second, quite different problem with the idiom of respect for the dead concerns 
the difficulty in spelling out precisely what ‘respectful treatment’ of the dead involves in 
practice.  Many researchers would be only too pleased to defer to the wishes of the 
researched regarding the respectful treatment of their remains, if only they knew what 
they were.  A sensible default assumption is that people whose remains are uncovered by 
archaeologists would have wished those relics to be treated with dignity.  Yet as Søren 
Holm has remarked, ‘[a]n interest in dignified treatment can only be fulfilled if we know 
what the person would see as dignified; and to know that we need to know quite a lot 
about the person, her culture and her place in that culture’ (Holm 2001: 446).  Often the 
cultural distance separating researcher and researched makes such knowledge hard to 
come by, and guesswork is a poor substitute.  Even where guidance to past beliefs is 
available from the genetic or cultural descendants of the subjects of study, archaeologists 
sometimes find themselves confronted by baffling world-views.  For some contemporary 
indigenous peoples, the dead, far from being non-existent, are still around in spiritual or 
ghostly form, extant subjects of interests.  Piotr Bienkowski notes that ‘indigenous 
peoples and other animists regard ancestors who died hundreds of years ago as still 
members of the group living today’ (Bienkowski unpub.: 3).  Where researchers face 
views which are so very incongruent with their own, their best efforts to ‘treat the dead 
with respect’ are liable to seem inadequate to those who regard the dead as a subset of the 
living.  Although it would be unwise to conclude from this that the discourse of respect 
for the dead and their remains should be abandoned (since we have nothing better to put 
in its place), some proffered defences of particular dealings with the dead as ‘respectful’ 
may be recognised to be little more than hand-waving.  
 
3. The problem of the missing subject 
Philosophers have been far from unanimous in their views on whether anything can be 
good or bad for the dead.  One writer who thinks that the dead retain some form of moral 
estate is T.M. Wilkinson, who believes not only that some interests are carried over from 
life to death (such as the interest in retaining a good reputation) but that certain new 
interests can develop after death (for example, ‘the interest in not having one’s remains 
desecrated’) (Wilkinson 2002: 34).  In Wilkinson’s view, ‘[w]e can make sense of 
harming someone after her death in the same way that we can make sense of 
remembering someone after her death’ (ibid.).  Furthermore, the interests that survive, or 
arise after, death are potentially as important as those that a person has during life and 
should not be seen as interests of the second rank.  Wilkinson notes that there are many 
examples of people going to great trouble during life to ensure that (what they conceive 
as) their posthumous interests will be satisfied.  And because these interests matter to 
people, there are resultant moral obligations on others to take them seriously (2002: 36).   
    Yet the notion of posthumous interests, whether new or continuing, is metaphysically 
troublesome for the reason that Eric Partridge, echoing Jefferson, has crisply stated:  
 After death, with the removal of a subject of harms and a bearer of interests, 
 it would seem that there can be neither ‘harm to’ nor ‘interests of’ the  
 decedent.   Because in such a context, these phrases (i.e. ‘harm to’ and  
 ‘interests of’) use prepositions with no objects, they are, strictly speaking, 
 senseless (Partridge 1981: 253). 
Once again, the rock in the way of positing posthumous interests is the non-existence, or 
permanent non-presence (though I shall not continue to specify this alternative), of a 
posthumous subject to have the interests.  Pace Wilkinson, it is more difficult to explain 
how we can harm or wrong someone after his death than how we can remember him (the 
latter is what philosophers call an intentional attitude, which represents in mind an object 
that need not currently exist).  Intriguingly, Partridge does not draw the apparent 
conclusion that it does not matter morally how we act in regard to deceased people (or 
their remains).  Rather, he thinks that we should promote the ‘fiction’ that the dead 
remain interest-holders in order to sustain ‘the moral order in society’ that might be 
compromised if such things as casual slander or the breaking of promises were tolerated 
where the ostensible ‘victim’ was dead (1981: 258).  But the relegation of the idea of 
posthumous interest-holders to the realms of fiction has struck many philosophers as 
morally dubious and conceptually inadequate.  
    One ingenious proposal to deal with the missing subject problem has been defended by 
a number of writers, including most notably George Pitcher and Joel Feinberg.  (See 
Pitcher 1984, Feinberg 1984.)  In their view, it is the living, antemortem person (an 
indisputably existing subject) that is the real subject of harmful or wrongful acts 
committed after her death, the harmful or wrongful impact being, in effect, retrospective.  
This may initially appear a far-fetched suggestion, involving an objectionable concept of 
backwards causation, something usually deemed to be metaphysically impossible.  But 
Pitcher and Feinberg deny that backwards causation is at issue, pointing out that the 
current significance of acts and projects – their status as successful or futile, say – is very 
often determined by what happens at a later date.  If, for instance, virtuous Sue devotes 
her life to fighting for a certain good cause and then after her death malicious Sam 
effectively negates all her previous efforts, then Sam makes it the case that those efforts 
were actually futile all along, although no one, including Sue, could have known that at 
the time.  By rendering the dominant project of Sue’s life a misadventure, Sam can be 
said to harm the antemortem Sue, causing her to have been wasting her time, despite the 
fact that the frustrating acts are performed only after her death.   
    This account can be applied to the case of archaeological treatment of human remains.  
Take the Egyptian pharaohs and other notables who went to great lengths to build secure 
resting-places for their mummified remains in order that their spirits should flourish in 
the after-life.  Their immortality-seeking projects were entirely defeated when tomb-
robbers or archaeologists undid the good work.  While the acts that wrecked their 
intentions were posthumously performed, they made it the case that the pharaohs and 
others were engaged during life in a project that was going to fail.  Admittedly, 
archaeologists who disbelieve the Egyptian cosmology will regard that project as 
mistaken, and reject the charge that disentombment is really harmful to the dead.  But the 
Pitcher-Feinberg account of how posthumous harm and benefit is possible relies on a 
theory of well-being which (roughly) holds us to be better or worse off according to 
whether our desires are fulfilled or thwarted.  On this account, Howard Carter’s 
dismantling of the tomb of Tutankhamen harmed the antemortem king by frustrating his 
desire for his remains to be left in peace.  In the words of Walter Glannon, ‘the future 
event of the thwarting of my present interests logically entails that I am now (while alive) 
harmed, even though I do not know it’ (Glannon 2001: 138).  Although Tutankhamen 
would never experience the rifling of his tomb, the fact that it would happen harmed him 
while still alive since it meant that he was entertaining a desire that would one day be 
frustrated.  
    The Pitcher-Feinberg theory of posthumous harm, and the theory of well-being which 
underpins it, are controversial and continue to be keenly debated by philosophers.  Some 
writers persist in finding the idea of backdated harm paradoxical or reject the desire-
satisfaction  theory of well-being.  For Glannon, nothing that occurs after a person’s 
death can make any difference to the ‘intrinsic properties of his mind and body’ while 
alive, and only such changes can constitute genuine harms or benefits (2001: 139).  
Christopher Belshaw similarly contends that there can be no harm after death since ‘the 
notion of harm seems to point to some description of your internal condition – it is not as 
good as it was, or not as good as it otherwise would have been’, and while the dead have 
no such ‘internal condition’, that of the antemortem subject is incapable of being affected 
by posthumous events (Belshaw 2009: 151).  Moreover, the unrestricted desire-
satisfaction theory of well-being seems unreasonable in implying, for example, that the 
fulfilment of a very mild wish of mine for an improvement in the welfare of a distant 
stranger would be good for me.  Yet there is intuitive force in the thought that the 
fulfilment of at least some kinds of self-regarding desire constitutes a benefit to us, and 
does so even when the fulfilment is posthumous.  Plausibly, it is better for Sue if Sam’s 
efforts, after her death, to derail the project with which she has identified herself during 
life should fail.  Likewise the non-observance of a person’s testamentary wishes may be 
seen as not merely subversive of the moral order of society, as Partridge holds, but 
positively bad for the testator.  But if we wish to avoid ascribing the harm that is done to 
a ghost, then we may prefer to assign it, as Pitcher and Feinberg propose, to the 
antemortem person.   
    It is also worth reflecting that the genus of harm has many species and is by no means 
limited to the more overt forms of physical or mental damage.  When Wheeler claimed 
that archaeologists do no harm to the ‘poor chaps’ they disinter, he ignored the fact that 
one sort of harm consists in the denial of a person’s right to make crucial decisions 
affecting his own future (a right that is deemed sufficiently important to be protected by 
the 14
th
 amendment to the US Constitution).  Almost no one thinks that living people can 
reasonably be compelled against their wishes to take part in medical or other research, 
even where such research can be guaranteed to do no lasting physical or mental injury.  
Yet, in spite of the second Vermillion principle, burials of dead subjects are routinely 
disturbed by archaeologists regardless of the likelihood that the deceased subjects would 
have regarded such a prospect with horror (if not for religious reasons, then sometimes 
from a simple wish to protect their privacy).   True, the second Vermilion principle calls 
only for ‘respect’ to be paid to the wishes of the deceased and places no outright ban on 
excavation in such cases.  But this call for respect possesses scant content if the standard 
presumption is that, where wishes clash, those of researchers may always take precedence 
over those of the interred dead.  This asymmetry of attitudes to the living and the dead is 
puzzling because the right to say what shall happen to our remains after our death, while 
not unqualified (e.g. we cannot reasonably demand that our heirs should scatter our ashes 
on Mount Everest), is a right of self-determination closely related to the right to lifetime 
bodily integrity.  Someone who ignores those wishes after our decease acts against our 
present right to determine the fate of our remains, and may thus be held to treat us 
harmfully as living subjects and without the deference that is due to rightfully self-
determining beings.   
    Archaeologists will argue that the research they conduct on bodies and burials serves 
other legitimate interests that need to be weighed in the balance against the autonomy 
interests of the dead whom they disturb.  And they will rightly point out that research 
done on the unconscious dead cannot cause mental pain to its subjects in the way that 
research done on the conscious and unwilling living would do; so it at least avoids that 
form of harm.  (However, since this defence of archaeological treatment of the dead 
would appear also to warrant unconsenting research done on living subjects who are in a 
persistent vegetative state, it perhaps should not be pressed too far.)  But the difficult 
question remains of determining to what extent the presumed wishes of the dead should 
be taken into practical account, and here the vague prescription of the second Vermillion 
principle is of little help.  From the researcher’s point of view, the most obvious practical 
difference between living and dead people is that the former can defend their own 
interests while the latter cannot.  But that is hardly a morally salient contrast.  
 
4. Resolving value conflicts 
Imagine that all tombs and burial sites of people who would have been strongly opposed 
to any interference with their remains bore ‘Keep Out’ signs at their entrance.  Maybe an 
explicit injunction to stay outside would give some archaeologists pause who normally 
feel few inhibitions about excavating burials.  Tombs and graves would appear more 
obviously like private houses, which no one thinks may be entered without the owner’s 
consent.  As Wilkinson remarks, ‘[b]y symmetry, if it would not be permissible to break 
into the property of living people against their wishes for the sake of a research project, it 
should not be when they are dead’ (Wilkinson 2002: p.36).   
    Archaeologists will reasonably protest, however, that it is not mere idle curiosity, or 
greed for treasure or plunder, or an arrogant disregard of others’ belief systems and moral 
values which impels them to investigate burials and the human remains within them.  
Their objective is the noble one of knowledge – a primary human good – and the methods 
they employ essential to accessing the information content of their sources.  According to 
the British Museum Newsroom: 
 The study of human remains provides one of the most direct and insightful 
 sources of information on different cultural approaches to death, burial practices 
 and belief systems, including ideas about the afterlife. … In addition to  
 furthering the public understanding of other cultures, human remains in 
 museum collections also help advance important research in fields such as 
 the history of disease, changing epidemiological patterns, forensics and 
 genetics (BM Newsroom 2005). 
While the truth of this statement is indisputable, its practical implications are elusive.  
Presumably not just any research into human remains, or modes of museum display of 
skeletons, unwrapped mummies or bog bodies, are ethically acceptable, but devising any 
more specific guidelines than the generalised prescriptions of the Vermillion Accord is 
hard in view of the competing values involved.  There is no sound philosophical reason to 
suppose that all value conflicts must in principle be capable of rational resolution even 
within a single worldview, or that moral demands can always be non-arbitrarily ranked.  
Where different worldviews are in competition, the problems are even more complex.  
But since in practice doing nothing is generally not an option, competing interests 
somehow need to be weighed and action-policies determined.  
     In the case of archaeological human remains the situation is frequently further 
complicated by the existence of a third class of stakeholders, namely people who claim 
genetic or cultural connection with the dead and a consequent right to a say in what 
happens to their remains.  Although archaeologists’ relations with indigenous 
communities are not the focus of the present chapter, it should be remembered that many 
members of such groups feel strongly that any disturbance of the dead in the name of 
science is an affront both to the deceased themselves and to their living descendants.  
Sa’ke’j Henderson, a Canadian lawyer of First Nations ancestry, puts a typical position 
forcefully: 
 For a variety of legal, ethical and spiritual reasons, most First Nations  
 strongly believe that the skeletons ought not to be disturbed.  FN considers 
 ancestral burial grounds or sites and their contents as ‘sacred’ and involving 
 freedom of religion…. They consider the spirits of such sites to be of central 
 importance, to implicate the order of embodied spirits and to be necessary 
 for the maintenance of good relations and harmony (Henderson 2009: 56). 
The moral imperative to take account of the beliefs and values of genetic or cultural 
descendants is recognised by the third principle of the Vermillion Accord, which holds 
that ‘respect for the wishes of the local community and or relatives or guardians of the 
dead shall be accorded whenever possible, reasonable and lawful’.  Yet in view of the 
potential conflicting interests involved in this eternal moral triangle, what, and whose, 
criteria are to be applied in defining what is ‘possible, reasonable and lawful’? 
    It is often claimed that the paramount moral imperative is to do no harm (primum non 
nocere).  To this, many would add that we should reduce to a minimum the risk of doing 
harm.  Taken strictly, this position threatens to rule out any archaeological practice 
whatsoever which disturbs the dead, except in rare cases where it is safe to assume that 
the deceased subjects would not have objected and where the consent of descendant 
communities is readily given.  (There are also cases where the dead would be disturbed 
anyway, in the course of development or the re-use of land, but it is not clear that 
archaeologists can legitimately shift all the moral responsibility for disturbance in such 
cases on to the shoulders of third-parties, given the advantage that they themselves take 
of it.)  A more workable and common-sense view, however, allows that it is sometimes 
right to cause lesser harms in order to prevent larger ones or produce greater benefits.  
The undoubted goods that flow from archaeological investigation of burials and their 
human and material contents provide a moral warrant for their research which is, though, 
much less than a carte blanche.  Foolish archaeologists will rush in where wiser ones fear 
to tread without carefully considering the moral issues and, where possible, consulting 
with members of local or descendant communities, who will often (though not always) 
have a better idea of what the subjects under investigation are likely to have wanted.  
Judicious investigators will also apply a light-touch approach to excavation where this 
will not seriously jeopardise attainment of the research objectives.  Excavations in 
sensitive areas should be planned and conducted in close consultation with local people, 
and care should be taken to do the minimum of damage to tombs and graves.  On the 
principle of diminishing marginal returns, the number of burials uncovered should be 
kept to the minimum, while non-intrusive techniques of investigation should be 
substituted for exhumation wherever possible.   
     Contemporary archaeologists are much less likely than their predecessors to assume 
that their interests invariably trump those of deceased subjects or of their living 
descendants.  If they are not to deserve the epithet of ‘sapient trouble-tombs’, 
archaeologists who deal with the dead should accept, as most now do, that theirs are not 
the only concerns in town – though they need not apologise for those concerns or 
concede their invariable subordination to those of other stake-holders.  The dead need not 
be regarded as being ethically off-limits to archaeologists but nor are they a morally 
unproblematic research resource to whose remnants anything at all may be done.  To 
negotiate the thorny path between these extremes requires archaeologists to operate in a 
spirit of compromise and concession which maintains the integrity of their own 
professional values while also acknowledging the legitimacy of others’.    
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